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‘Securitizing Democracy and Democratic Security: a Reflection on 
Democratization Studies’1 
 
Abstract 
The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent attempt to engineer a democratic state highlights the 
strengths and limitations of democratization studies to explain why, where and how democracy 
occurs. This paper argues that the way power is played out globally and locally determines the 
nature of democratic success or failure. Traditionally, democratization studies has focused on 
internal structures and agents of change. However, Iraq indicates that democratization is more 
complex than traditional comparative politics approaches have ascribed it. In this paper, there are 
two key propositions. Firstly, global power-holders do not hold the exclusive ability to bring about 
democratization, but the drive for democratization is shaped by the display of power and disputes 
over global authority at least as much, if not more, than national level politics. Secondly, the display 
of power internally determines two key dimensions of democratization: state capacity and societal 
security. This paper relies on the example of Iraq to illustrate the shortcomings of the traditional 
approach to democratization and calls on a reinvigorated inter-disciplinary approach to why 
democratization succeeds or fails. 
 
Introduction 
That the events of 11 September changed profoundly the world we live in is so obvious as to 
be hardly worth saying. But the politics of the post 9/11 world is full of contradictions. We now live 
in a world where western states can openly defend the use of torture and routinely employ detention 
without trial and, at the same time, claim to be protecting and advancing a liberal agenda of 
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democracy and individual rights. The securitization of global politics following 9/11, the 
subsequent debates as to whether we live in a more, or less, liberal world and the real challenges to 
Atlantic domination within the international system have given new layers of complexity to the 
‘globalisation’ of democracy.2 This paper argues that ‘democratization studies’ still fails to take 
sufficiently seriously several dimensions of democratization, despite past partial engagements. The 
contemporary dilemmas of democratization no longer refer to either levels of development or 
agency and elite leadership, but rather to the ways in which power is played out globally and at 
home. In this regard, the paper makes two propositions. Firstly, global power-holders do not hold 
the exclusive ability to bring about democratization, as we may see in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, but 
the drive for democratization is shaped by the display of power and disputes over global authority at 
least as much, if not more, than national level politics. This drive for democratization is framed in 
terms of security. Secondly, the display of power internally determines two key dimensions of 
democratization: state capacity and human security. Without democratic security at the state and 
individual level, a democratic transition will fail. 
The invasion of Iraq and the subsequent war forces us to recognise that the terrain of 
democratization has irrevocably altered since the 1980s and 1990s when democratization studies 
was consolidated as an important sub-field within politics and international relations. Yet the 
process of intellectual catch-up with these transformations has been woefully slow. For too many 
scholars, analyses of democratization remain locked in a comparative politics mode of analysis and 
the international dimensions are reduced to, at best, the status of a minor footnote. A reassessment 
of democratization studies with Iraq in mind produces several additional explanatory factors, 
including the securitization of democracy and an intensification of the drama of identity and 
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stateness, which leads to a gradual seepage of interest away from some very important prerequisites 
for democratic development over the long term. 
This article is an attempt to open a debate about the way forward. The argument is, in one 
sense, straightforward: what is required is a creative and constructive engagement between 
comparative politics, from where early debates emerged, and international studies on the other. A 
dialogue between the these fields can help build a critical approach, be able to identify the drivers 
of contemporary democratization and explore what it has come to mean and, at the same time, 
provide a way to explore some of the core issues, long identified within democratization studies, as 
the obstacles to democratization. These include questions of stateness, state capacity and 
governance. Linking them to the ‘international’, however, means that this paper will be able to 
explore them in a more holistic fashion than has usually been the case hitherto. At the same time, 
making explicit the ways in which international concerns now shape political agendas traditionally 
regarded as ‘domestic’, will allow us to explore more fully the normative underpinning that lies 
behind current pro-democracy practices. 
 
The Limits of Democratization Studies 
  
The study of democracy and democratization has undergone considerable change since Seymour 
Martin Lipset set out the economic and political prerequisites of democracy.
3
 Yet, the war in Iraq 
and the failure of democratization in much of the former Soviet Union reminds us that 
democratization is a complex process that Guillermo O’Donnell and Thomas Carothers point out 
does not have an end.
4
 Rather, states are more, or less, democratic. The traditional study of 
democratization largely became a comparative politics study of a one-way process of regime 
change, from authoritarianism to democracy.  
 This comparative politics approach to democratization is problematic in both its 
concentration on agency and domestic political factors. As Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan 
illustrate, structure is as important a driver of democratization.
5
 For example, Linz and Stepan 
discover that structural elements of the prior regime have an important impact on regime paths and 
consolidation ‘tasks’.6 To a great extent, these structural elements have an impact on the nature of 
agency. In this regard, Linz and Stepan find that the “possibilities and limits of [elite] ‘pacts’” are 
largely, although not wholly, determined by the structure of the prior regime. Others such as 
Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, illustrate how economic structures determine the 
opportunities and paths of democratization.
7
 Finally, many authors have illustrated the impact of 
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ethnic structures on democratic transitions.
8
 Whether political, economic or cultural, these 
structures have an important impact on democratic transition, but at the same time should not be so 
detached from agency in that both structure and agency are ‘mutually constituted’. 
 Perhaps the most often cited (and contested) structural causes of democratization have been 
geographical location.
9
 The world saw democratization spreading from Southern Europe to Latin 
America to Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, the debate was whether or not we could use the 
same explanatory models for Latin American and Post-Communist states. Perhaps location has 
made a difference to the path and nature of democratization in different states in different regions of 
the world. Carsten Q. Schneider and Phillipe C. Schmitter argue that many Central and East 
European democratizing states have performed far better than their South European and Latin 
American counterparts.
10
 However, eventually democratization studies was used to explain regime 
change of any type which illustrated some degree of liberalization. Democratization studies 
eventually moved beyond the ‘third wave’ democracies and began looking at South-East Asia, Sub-
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Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and the Middle-East. These applications have proved the more 
difficult test for democratization studies for three reasons. Firstly, there are few existing or 
successful democracies in these regions making the notions of ‘transition’ then ‘consolidation’ 
difficult to apply. Secondly, the nature of the state is still challenged by alternative organizing 
narratives which bring into question the nature of statehood and justice. Thirdly, we cannot talk 
about democratization efforts in these regions without taking into account the exogenous factors of 
power and norms in international politics. 
 The term ‘transition’ in democratization studies is problematic. On one hand, the term 
transition indicates a common starting point and a common end point, ordinarily referred to as 
‘consolidation’. Across the different regions that experienced the ‘third wave’, there has not been a 
common starting point. Even within one region such as Central and Eastern Europe, there was no 
common starting point.
11
 Furthermore, there has not been a common end to many transitions, as 
illustrated in much of the post-Soviet area.
12
 For example, we saw in the Russian Federation a 
flirtation with democracy only to return to a new type populist authoritarianism.
13
 Thus, ‘transition’ 
is not necessarily a transition to democracy but could be a transition to an alternative form of 
authoritarianism, which may or may not be ‘less bad’. On the other hand, the term ‘transition’ often 
obscures both normative political goals and geo-political elements of democratization. For example, 
Milada Anna Vachudová and Tim Snyder argue that ‘transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe 
‘smuggled’ the ‘return to Europe’ movement in the academic literature and further obscured the 
differences between these states, such as existing ethnic heterogeneity and the resulting ethno-
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nationalism.
14
 Thus, upon entry in to the European Union, some states were more democratic than 
others.
15 
 While the traditional comparative approach maintained a strong emphasis on the state The 
democratization literature has also undervalued the capacity of the state in terms of democratic 
governance. Many authors ignored state capacity as a determinant of democratization presumably 
expecting that a democratic transition from bureaucratic authoritarianism would lead to a strong, 
modern state that could acquire the responsibilities of a liberal democratic state. For instance, while 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Terry Lynn Karl both consider the role of the state in Latin American 
democratic politics, neither considers the tensions between the extensive security infrastructure and 
the new democratizing societies much less the capacity for states to provide democratic 
governance.
16
 Linz and Stepan make some attempt to direct the democratization literature in this 
direction by problematizing the notion of ‘stateness’ in democratization.17 Similar to Rustow’s 
notion of national integrity, ‘stateness’ has more to do with territorial integrity and sovereignty than 
state capacity.
18
 Rather, state capacity is the ability for the state to provide for democratic 
governance with an established assumption that state capacity is directly related to the path of 
                                                 
14
 Milada Anna Vachudova and Tim Snyder, ‘Are Transitions Transitory? two types of political change in Eastern 
Europe since 1989’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.11 No.1 (1997), pp.1-35. 
15
 Geoffrey Pridham, ‘EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States - Formality and 
Reality’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40 No.3 (2002), pp.953-73. 
16
 Guillermo O'Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American view with 
glances at some postcommunist countries’, World Development, Vol.21 No.8 (1993), pp.1355-1369. Terry Lynn Karl, 
‘Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, Vol.23 No.1 (1990), pp.1-21. 
17
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins, 1996). 
18
 Dankwart Rustow, ‘Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, Vol.2 No.3 (1970), 
pp.337-363. 
  
democracy.
19
 The paper expands on the relationship between state capacity and democratization 
later in this paper. 
 As others have said before us, the traditional comparative politics approach simply does not 
go far enough in explaining democratization. As Petr Kopeckỳ and Cas Mudde argue, the 
democratization literature has neglected two fundamental dimensions of democratization: the 
relationship between nation and state-building and the international dimension.
20
 More recently, 
there have been attempts to address these deficiencies from the perspectives of citizenship and 
globalization studies. As they regard democratization, the two areas of study coincide to stress the 
role of global civil society as an ‘opportunity structure through which to engage in social struggle in 
order to transform and extend citizenship’.21 Yet, international politics illustrates that there are other 
international forces at work in democratization. The paper argues that as much as democratization 
has been shaped by domestic agents and structures, it has also been shaped by international politics. 
In the following section, the paper highlights the need to incorporate the international dimension 
into democratization studies. 
 
The ‘Global’ Factor 
For many transitologists, the main exogenous factor of democratization was the zeitgeist of 
liberalization. As stated earlier, democratization studies most often focused on endogenous agency 
as the drivers of democratization, despite the fact that external actors have been important 
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‘consolidators’ in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.22 However, there has been an 
ongoing discussion of international actors and democratization in both the area studies and 
International Relations literature. For area studies, the focus on external actors and their importance 
in the democratization process came with the lead-up to the 2004 enlargement of the European 
Union (EU).
23
 Following enlargement, much of the focus has been on how the EU is becoming an 
international, over that of a regional, democracy promoter.
24
 International Relations has long been 
interested in the relationship between democracy and international politics as can be seen in the 
debate over the democratic peace theory.
25
 However, much of this literature has been on how 
democratization impacts international relations, rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, this debate has 
influenced decision-makers to the point that the democratic peace theory has become a supporting 
pillar of Western (and in particular US) foreign policy. In essence, the democratic peace theory has 
led to a securitization of democratization. More recently, there has been increased attention given to 
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the impact of specific actors, such as the USA or United Nations, as well as larger processes like 
globalization on democratization.
26
 The war in Iraq has illustrated the importance of exogenous 
actors and their impact on the democratization process and democratization studies must change to 
continue to have some explanatory power. 
The traditional approach to democratization does not reflect the current events in the world. 
The argument laid out here states that democratization studies requires an inter-disciplinary 
evolution to deal with these corrections in our understanding of democratization. Many of the 
explanations of failed transitions, statehood and capacity, and the impact of international actors can 
be found in such areas as political theory, international relations, development, globalization and 
area studies. As an attempt to force democratization from the outside, Iraq illustrates many of the 
shortcomings of democratization studies. The democratic transitions in the ‘third wave’ had their 
own external causes and influences. The causes include the change and eventual end of the Cold 
War, changes in United States foreign policy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, democratic 
‘contagion’, and a general zeitgeist for democratization.27 Not only was this the case for the Eastern 
Bloc, but also for Southern Europe and Latin America. The influences on democratic transitions 
have also had an international quality including Western democratic engineering, regional 
integration and global civil society. However, none of these countries came to liberalization or 
democratization (even those that have since failed or never got off the ground) by way of invasion, 
occupation and large-scale violence. But yet, the democratization literature continues to analyse 
Iraq in a like-for-like fashion. Unlike the ‘third wave’ democratic transitions, Iraq’s regime change 
was the result of the securitization of democratization. Thus, today we witness a much more 
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dramatic example of Valerie Bunce’s worries of how far to the ‘East’ democratization studies can 
go.
28 
 Democracy and democratization has been an important part of the West’s foreign policy 
rhetoric since the end of the Second World War. This democracy-promotion rhetoric was primarily 
tied to the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. ‘Protecting democracy’ is not only the core 
rhetorical principle of the ‘War against Terror’ but was also the core rhetorical principle of 
‘containment’.29 While democracy and democratization was a core rhetorical principle of US 
foreign policy during the Cold War, one only need to look as far as Latin America, North and South 
East Asia, and the Middle East to see that the US supported any alternative to communism, whether 
democratic or not. However, since the end of the Cold War, the notion that democracy brings with 
it peace and stability has become more prominent in US foreign policy. The democratic peace 
principle has been as relevant to the George W. Bush administration as it has been to the Bill 
Clinton administration.
30
 This is not a claim that spreading democracy is the only reason for the 
2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Rather, we claim that ‘democratization’ is at least 
one of the main reasons and thus demands that the democratization studies literature be able to take 
the securitization of democratization into account in its overall conceptualisation of the political 
process. 
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 Vincent Boudreau argues, as democracy became a core foreign policy goal, ‘questions about 
the policies that might best help democratic systems also become more urgent.’31 The democracy 
promotion debates moved from how best to topple a tyrant, to how to entrench a consolidated 
democracy. Thus, while democratization had become an assumed ‘high’ foreign policy goal, 
democracy promotion became a series of ‘smaller policy puzzles that a range of governmental and 
non-governmental actors could try to solve’.32 These ‘policy puzzles’ could range from individual 
projects to nation-building processes.
33
 Regime change in Iraq came on the back of democracy 
promotion in the former Yugoslavia as well as less concentrated efforts in Afghanistan, East Timor, 
and Haiti. The current crisis in Iraq is painted well by Boudreau who says that ‘we find ourselves at 
an ambivalent pass, where the need to trust democracy promotion policies uneasily coexists with 
the lessons we have learned about how daunting a task it can be to help countries develop a 
democratic system’.34 We have seen already how Iraq challenges the democratization studies 
literature internally, but the war and occupation also challenges the external influences on 
democratization. Many states are receiving democracy assistance, such as Ukraine and Botswana, 
but none are undergoing democratization with thousands of foreign troops. Thus, Iraq raises a 
challenge to policy-makers to employ democracy-assistance techniques within a complex 
environment riddled with insecurity. 
The response to 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have always carried 
with them a core rhetorical principle of democratization. More importantly, 2001 changed the world 
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not just because it opened a new form of international terrorism, but rather because of the US and it 
allies’ reactions to this terrorism, even to the point of intervention in unwinnable wars, first in 
Afghanistan and then in Iraq. What does this mean in so far democratization studies is concerned? 
Firstly, western assumptions are based on democratic peace theory, which means that if Iraq can be 
turned into a democracy, it can become a stable, predictable, and friendly part of the international 
community. Secondly, Iraq reflects a belief that democracy can be, and in some cases must be, 
engineered from outside. In this sense, the US moves beyond humanitarian interventionism, which 
arguably shored up support for democracy in the Balkans in the 1990s, to military interventionism 
designed to shore up democracy. The move from humanitarian intervention to military intervention, 
of which the UK under Tony Blair was a committed part, represents a qualitative shift from the 
model of external support for democracy typified by the EU in Eastern Europe. Military 
intervention is quite different from the west’s view in the cold war that democracy had to be 
protected by containment. It is also different from the view in the 1980s and 1990s that democracy 
could be supported. Instead, now what we have is a pro-western view that democracy can be 
created and manufactured, even when there seems to be little substantive basis for it in any 
structural sense. 
 
The ‘Societal’ Factor 
Iraq illustrates that the assumption democracy can be created by war and international power 
is proving to be erroneous. The military intervention in Iraq stresses the primacy of the international 
over the domestic. In this context, the importance of the international dimension means stressing the 
securitization of democratization, as discussed above. The change in stress forces us to question 
‘policies in support of democracy’ as a means of imposing democracy from above. Secondly, where 
international relations explains the thrust of democratization in the world today, comparative 
politics can help us explain why it is does not work out as policy makers think it should. The 
intervention in Iraq means we need, as Kopeckỳ and Mudde stress, to problematize the relationship 
  
between the nation and state.
35
 In this section, national integrity and state capacity have a significant 
impact on the performance of democratic transitions. While there has been considerable discussion 
of each of these issues in turn in the literature, they have not always been found in the 
democratization literature. Our focus on Iraq will illustrate the challenges for both democratization 
studies and democracy in Iraq. 
Democratization is as much about remaking the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ as much as it is a 
restructuring of power relationships. Linz and Stepan argue that the logics of the ‘nation’ and ‘state’ 
run counter to each other where there exists any sectarian divides, which is to say the overwhelming 
number of states in the international system. Nation-building is a process of deciding ‘whose nation 
is this?’. State-building in a democratic transition is concerned with redirecting state institutions to 
serve equally, fairly and unanimously.
36
 In turn, nation-building is about capturing state institutions 
to support one group more so than another. Some scholars have argued that the relationship 
between nation-building and state-building has in fact led to intra- and inter-state conflict, casting a 
shadow on the democratic peace theory.
37
 In essence, when one sectarian group attempts to 
dominate the state, it is both likely to create internal unrest, as the ‘other’ reacts, and regional 
instability, as neighbours get involved. For Mansfield and Snyder, the Yugoslav area supports their 
claims of a violation of the democratic peace theory. Despite a successful attack on the democratic 
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peace theory, there remains the problem in differentiating between regime change in general and 
democratization specifically.
38 
 In this regard, the familiar complaint is that democracy promotes ‘one person, one vote’, 
automatically favouring the largest group assuming (and this is often a big assumption) that 
individuals rally behind the ‘in-group’ rather than a non-ethnic political party. Donald Horowitz 
reminds us that as ethnic competition and thus salience increases, there will be increasing pressure 
for ordinarily non-ethnic parties to pick sides.
39
 Altogether, John Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ which 
dictates constitutional neutrality does not lead to a prolonged political settlement within societies 
divided by sectarianism.
40
 To avoid this kind of state-capture, several scholars have suggested 
methods of reducing tension between sectarian groups within a democracy. Arend Lijphart’s 
consociationalism offers groups ‘internal self-determination’, but this requires that groups 
effectively live in separate communities.
41
 Even should groups live separate, homogenous 
communities, there still exist tensions between centralisation and decentralisation.
42
 Democratic 
liberalism, as put forward by Albert Weale, emphasises the need for political participation as a 
means of promoting compromise through negotiation. While democratic liberalism says much 
about the political, it says little about society.
43
 More specifically, different groups have different 
capacities for bargaining. Democratic liberalism requires that all participating groups have similar 
levels of bargaining power, a circumstance unlikely to happen in the real world especially in times 
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of transition. However, no form of decision-making procedure will ever be perfect. ‘The creative 
challenge is to devise methods of governance that both condition existing ways of doing things 
democratically and open the way to their re-evaluation over time’.44 The more that the state can 
provide public goods for all, despite group membership and avoid accumulating private goods for 
one group over another, the greater the chance that the state will remain unchallenged. 
 If we rely on Rustow’s demarcation of liberalization and transition as the first two stages of 
democratization, we can see that many countries have failed or at least been set considerably back 
because of the lack of national integrity. The largest group of states that fit this bill are those in the 
post-Soviet area (arguably excluding the three Baltic States). Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the 
Russian Federation (to name only four) have all had their difficulties in maintaining control over 
their territory and providing support among all relevant groups for the state.
45
 Georgia has had to 
face the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, neither of which is headed towards a 
solution especially after the precedent to make Kosovo independent. Ukraine first settled a 
contentious relationship with the Crimean Tatars, but now seems to be locked into a political 
struggle between the nationalist west and the pro-Russian east. Moldova experienced a short 
insurrection in 1992 resulting in the breakaway area of Transdneistria. Russia, an important agitator 
in these areas, has had its own problems in Chechnya (and to a lesser extent Dagestan and 
Tatarstan) which has seen a nationalist, separatist movement turn into an ‘Islamic jihad’ against the 
Russian state.
46
 All four states experienced an initial liberalization following independence in 1991 
and all four have been impeded in varying degrees by their own challenge to the state.  
 Then what chance for Iraq? The internal and external challenge to Iraqi ‘stateness’ does not 
bode well for the future of democracy. The identity politics in Iraq are defined by two cleavages, 
ethnicity and religious sect. Ethnically Iraq is split between the Kurds (predominantly Sunni) and 
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Arabs. The Arabs are themselves split between Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. Intra-Iraqi violence 
has mainly been fought along these cleavages. Of course, this is only one side of the large-scale 
violence in Iraq. The 2003 United States-led invasion, regime change, and subsequent occupation 
have exacerbated these tensions. While there has been considerable debate about the number of 
deaths in Iraq since 2003, there is no debating that hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died and 
millions have fled abroad mostly to surrounding countries.
47
 The multi-dimensional violence in Iraq 
has called into question the very essence of the state.  
Yet, amazingly the academic literature discussing the prospects of democracy in Iraq says 
little about these challenges to Iraq’s ‘stateness’. Ordinarily, democracy and security in Iraq are 
discussed in two ways. Many scholars discuss regime change and democracy in Iraq, but fail to 
discuss the impact of sectarian violence on the ‘democratic’ transition occurring in Iraq.48 Diamond 
sheds light on the mistakes of democracy building in Iraq but says little about bringing peace 
between domestic groups instead focusing on relations between the occupied and the occupier.
49
 
Perhaps even more frustrating, many scholars who attempt to address both democracy and security 
together tend to focus on the latter with scant attention to the former.
50
 Early in the conflict, Andrew 
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Arato highlights the importance of the state in Iraq’s democratic future.51 He argues, ‘at present a 
pseudo-democratic government relying on external force, a theocratic authoritarian regime, or even 
the fragmentation of the now stateless country seems much more likely than representative 
government and the rule of law for a unified Iraq’.52 The Iraqi state is central to Iraqi 
democratization and democracy. 
The economic circumstances of Iraq were poor leading to the 2003 invasion, following 
nearly 13 years of economic sanctions despite the ‘oil-for-food’ programme begun in 1997. The 
purpose of the sanctions, initiated when Iraq invaded Kuwait, was to force disarmament and regime 
change.
53
 Significant disarmaments had occurred during the 1990’s but the Hussein regime 
continued to glean from the top of Iraqi society. Unlike, for example, the ‘Eastern bloc’ or Latin 
American democratic transitions, Iraq’s transition was not the result of economic crisis but instead 
invasion. Thus, the focus on the political economy of Iraq’s transition and its impact on democracy 
lie within the post-invasion era. The political economy of Iraq’s democratic transition is dominated 
by oil. The two groups that are in the best location to benefit from the petroleum industry are the 
Kurds and the Sunni Arabs, while Iraq’s largest group, the Shiia, are largely left out. Thus, the 
geographical location of oil fields enhances the conflict between groups. The Coalition Provisional 
Authority, Iraqi Interim Government and the current Iraqi Transitional Government have all placed 
access to the profits of oil at the top of the post-Hussein political agenda.  
While the abundance of oil is a fantastic ‘cash-cow’ for a rehabilitating state like Iraq, its 
very existence adds to the tensions between ethnic and religious sects as well as the Iraqi state and 
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regional autonomy. Far more stable states have suffered the ‘resource curse’ encouraging political 
corruption and thus impeding democratization.
54
 Sunni Arabs are keen to maintain their control 
over the petroleum industry. At the same time, the Shiia Arabs must receive a mutually justified 
percentage of the profits. Without which, there is unlikely to be an end to violence until there is an 
end to Iraq. Again, the state and its ‘stateness’ is at the centre of any analysis of democratization in 
Iraq. National integrity and state capacity are key to understanding the political transformation in 
Iraq and shed light on their contribution to the democratization studies literature. 
 The conflict and occupation in Iraq will have a significant effect on how external 
engineering looks in the future. Iraq illustrates that democratization studies needs a more 
sophisticated understanding of societal (and human) security and the role it plays in 
democratization. Institutions and the rule of law are inherent parts of the Weberian state. Well 
performing institutions are ordinarily, although not always, a characteristic of democratic states.
55
 
Yet, despite the progress seen in the regions of the ‘third-wave’, the lack of security has impaired 
many states that have made great strides politically and economically. At the same time, the lack of 
a respect for societal and human security offers a further explanation as to why some states have 
reverted to autocratic ways or those states who simply never carried forward with democratic 
reforms in the first place. This underdeveloped, or at least underappreciated, notion of security in 
democratization studies reflects itself on to democracy promotion. The policies and projects of 
democracy promotion must also encourage the development of human security as another ‘pillar’ of 
democracy. 
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Before Iraq, the US was the only superpower willing to venture across the globe to intervene 
militarily and politically. Furthermore, the US was the only superpower that could validly claim to 
be ‘spreading democracy’ despite the challenges and at times failed logic that followed this policy. 
Democracy promotion in the future will again return to the impact of globalization as a politico-
economic process that has the potential to empower individuals. For democratization studies, this 
means again turning away from the view that democratization is an elite project.
56
 At the same time, 
Iraq suggests that it is hard to accept the notion that building democracy is a good faith liberal 
project of citizenship, current in many debates about external promotion of democratization. So 
what does this mean? Is democracy promotion simply realist politics by any other name? Yes and 
no. Iraq illustrates the use of democracy promotion as a ‘frame’ or ‘hook’ on which to hang geo-
politics. Democracy promotion not only validates the intervention at home but also to foreign 
leaders (at least) abroad. Yet, the fall out of Iraq means that democracy promotion will again go 
through a crisis as it did in the Clinton administration.
57
  
 However, the securitization of democracy and its link to the ‘War on Terror’, which remains 
an active policy despite Iraq, means that the US government can only withdraw so much without 
giving up the game completely. Second, US foreign policy will continue to be predicated on a 
messianic principle of civilising. It is telling that many democratic and republican candidates for the 
2008 US presidential elections have criticised the war in Iraq and excesses of the ‘War on Terror’ 
like Guantanamo Bay, but few have touched on the ongoing war in Afghanistan. The future of 
democracy promotion will again return to promoting elite transition, party development and civil 
society (perhaps a Nordic brand of democracy promotion). Yet, this brings us to how far 
engineering can go? Democratization studies, and by its extension democracy promotion, must also 
reconsider the role of the state in democratization. With the role of the state on one hand and 
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democracy promotion on the other, this argument recognises an increasing intertwining between 
state and engineering. 
 
Conclusion 
 How to address these issues in democratization studies? Clearly there is a need for 
democratization studies to address these issues since these are the very issues facing democratising 
countries and policy makers thinking about democracy building. Yet, how to do we do it? This 
paper invites a more inter-disciplinary approach that is at the same time less theoretically narrow. 
Democratization studies can gain greatly from the insights of comparative politics for its 
concentration on agency, international political economy for its focus on globalization and 
citizenship, as well as International Relations for its concentration on power, interests and norms in 
international politics. There is a need now more than ever for scholars from different parts of the 
political studies community to speak to each other. In so doing, democratization studies also needs 
to reorganise itself as a creative, genuinely inter-disciplinary endeavour able to analyse cogently 
and critically contemporary politics at the global and domestic level. Overall, there is a hope in this 
way to offer a mode of analysis of democratization that avoids endorsing what may be seen as 
morally indefensible and tantamount to the imposition of Western values and interests through 
terror and torture. 
